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Abstract—Carpooling service is an effective solution to balance the limited number of taxicabs and the soaring 
demands from users. Thus, how to motivate more passengers to participate in carpooling is essential, especially in 
extreme weather or in rush hours. Most of existing works focus on improving the availability, convenience and 
security of carpooling service, while ignoring to guarantee the quality of experience (QoE) of passengers. In this 
work, we focus on how to fulfill the expected sojourn time of passengers in carpooling service using coalition game. 
We formulate the QoE-guarantee problem as a benefit allocation problem. To solve the problem, we quantify the 
impatience of passengers due to detouring time delay, depending on their own expected sojourn time and expected 
compensation per unit time of delay. The algorithm named PCA is proposed to minimize the impatience of all 
passengers, under which we calculate the compensation for passengers based on Shapley value. We prove that PCA 
can guarantee the fairness of passengers. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that PCA can minimize the 
impatience of passengers. Moreover, compared with the existing algorithm DST, PCA can reduce the payment of 
each passenger by 14.4% averagely with only 13.3% loss of driver’s revenue. However, the least expected revenue 
of the driver can still be fulfilled, which produces a win-win solution for both passengers and drivers in carpooling. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Urban traffic congestion can cause numerous detrimental effects, such as time loss, air pollution and 
excessive fuel consumption [1], [2]. Carpooling service is a beneficial solution to solve the problem. By 
allowing multiple passengers to share a vehicle, carpooling can reduce the total mileage to deliver 
passengers, therefore alleviating traffic congestion and reducing excessive emissions effectively [3]–[5]. 
On one hand, the ride demands from users explosively increase in rush hours. On the other hand, a 
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taxicab only carries one or two passengers and leaves other seats empty [6]. By integrating empty seat 
resources, carpooling service can make more passengers share a taxicab [7], thus maintaining the 
balance between the limited taxicab resources and the soaring ride demands. 
 
Many works on carpooling service focus on designing recommendation systems [5], [7]–[9], solving 
vehicle routing problems [9]–[12] and inventing security protocols [13]–[16] to improve availability, 
convenience and security of carpooling. However, only a few works have focused on designing incentive 
mechanisms to motivate both passengers and drivers to participate in carpooling. Zhang et al. [7] 
presented a reciprocal price mechanism to provide economic incentives for carpooling. Zhang et al. [9] 
proposed a win-win carpool fare model to encourage both drivers and passengers to participate in 
carpooling. Li et al. [17] proposed a dynamic pricing method and divide the payoffs according to the 
contribution of each individual. However, all the above studies cannot guarantee the quality of experience 
(QoE) of passengers. A simple example in the following paragraph is used to better illustrate this 
problem. 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, passenger p1 and passenger p2 request for carpooling service to improve the 
probability for successfully taking a taxicab in rush hours. The start point of p1 is close to the start point of 
p2, and the destination of p1 is close to the destination of p2. Before carpooling service starts, p1 sends 
route 1 to server shown in Fig. 2 while p2 sends route 2 to the server. Then the server calculates the 
best route for carpooling, which is route 3. Driver will pick up p2 before p1 and put down p1 before p2 based 
on the routes on the map. When carpooling service completes, each passenger will arrive at destination. 
However, the actual travel time of passengers are prolonged due to detours, which will make them be 
impatient. Meanwhile, each passenger will still pay the fare based on his/her actual travel time and travel 
distance. Therefore, the QoE of them will suffer. With lower QoE, passengers will be unwilling to 
participate in carpooling. In this work, we propose a compensation scheme to ensure the QoE of 
passengers, i.e., to mitigate the impatience of them. Meanwhile, the proposed scheme can guarantee the 
interest of both passengers and drivers, so as to attract them to participate in carpooling. To effectively 
solve the QoE guarantee problem, we have to solve the following challenges: (I) Passengers have their 
own interests to decide whether to participate in carpooling or not. Therefore, how to make passengers 
have no incentive to reject to participate in carpooling is a challenge. (II) In carpooling service, the routes 
of all passengers are not exactly the same, which can make them suffer time delay, thus making them be 
impatient. We decide to compensate passengers based on the impatience of them suffered in carpooling. 
  
This work has been accepted by The 24th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems 
December 11 - 13, 2018, Singapore. The copyrights are held by authors and the corresponding copyright 
holders. This document is only for quick dissemination of research findings. This document is not the 
final version of the conference paper. For detail, please see the original conference paper when it is 
online. 
Please Cite:  
Jiale Huang, Jigang Wu, Long Chen, Coalitional Game Based Carpooling Algorithms for Quality of 
Experience, the 24th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems 
December 11 - 13, 2018, Singapore. 
 
Therefore, how to quantify the impatience of passengers is important. (III) Passengers should be treated 
fairly, which means that the compensation algorithm should ensure the fairness of passengers. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Motivation Example 
 
II. Problem Formulation 
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For the benefit of simplicity, the fare for a travel T with distance l and time t is calculated by [16]: 
 
In rush hours, the limited number of taxicabs is difficult to meet passengers’ demands. In this setting, 
incentive to motivate drivers to pick up more passengers is needed. Therefore, we define a price 
fluctuation coefficient ρ to give drivers more than general fare to motivate them. And the fare for a travel 
with price fluctuation coefficient is formulated as [16]: 
 
Moreover, passengers have their own highest price αF(T) that they are willing to pay for their own travel. 
In fact, the fare for a travel is often no more than the highest price, and the difference between them is 
called passenger surplus, given by [16]: 
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Similarly, drivers have the least expected revenue βF(T) that they are willing to provide passengers with a 
taxicab service. The difference between the actual revenue of driver xd and the least expected revenue of 
driver is defined as driver surplus, given by: 
 
In carpooling service, the routes of all passengers are not exactly the same so that the actual travel time 
of each passenger may be prolonged. Time delay may cause a decrease in the QoE of passengers, i.e., 
make them be impatient. Meanwhile, passengers have their own expected sojourn time and expected 
compensation per unit time of delay. Assume that the routes of all passengers are exactly different. When 
driver serve passengers following different sequence, passengers may suffer different degrees of 
impatience. 
 
Given a sequence ϭ, we quantify the impatience of the i-th passenger suffered in carpooling as: 
 
And given a sequence ϭ, the impatience of all passengers suffered in carpooling is: 
 
For drivers, we should make them be willing to serve passengers. Therefore, we define an incentive 
coefficient ε which is bigger than β but no more than ρ, and use it to give driver a fare higher than his/her 
least expected revenue. And the actual revenue of the driver is calculated by: 
 
The total compensation is calculated by: 
 
Therefore, we have: 
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And the QoE-guarantee problem is formulated as: 
 
 
Where the objective function guarantees the QoE of passengers by compensating them with more fare. 
Constraint C1 illustrates the source of compensation for passengers, while constraints C2 and C3 
indicate that the interest of drivers can be guaranteed. Constraints C4 and C5 ensure that carpooling 
is beneficial to passengers, while constraint C6 guarantees the impatience of passengers suffered in 
carpooling is minimal. 
III. Simulation Results 
Using coalitional game, we have modeled carpooling service in rush hours as a coalitional game. By 
analyzing the utility of coalition formed by passengers and driver, we have proved that the coalition in 
carpooling service is stable. Depending on passengers’ expected sojourn time and expected 
compensation per unit time of delay, we have quantified their impatience due to detouring time delay. We 
have proposed an effective compensation algorithm named PCA to minimize the impatience of all 
passengers suffered in carpooling, under which we compensate passengers based on Shapley value. We 
have proved that PCA can guarantee the fairness of passengers. Extensive simulation results indicate 
that, PCA can minimize the impatience of all passengers suffered in carpooling effectively. Moreover, 
PCA can reduce the payment of each passenger by 14.4% averagely with only 13.3% loss of driver’s 
revenue, compared with DST [16]. However, PCA can give driver a fare higher than his/her least 
expected revenue, which means that PCA is a win-win solution for carpooling to guarantee both the 
interests of drivers and the QoE of passengers. In the future, we will try to extend our model to suit for the 
general case when there are multiple taxicabs. 
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